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Extended abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse how fiscal adjustment comes about when both central and sub-
national governments are involved in consolidation. Devolution of public finances creates problems 
of fiscal imbalance at lower tiers of government. Whereas there usually is a constitutionally 
determined division of spending tasks, revenues are shared across different government levels. 
Incomplete fiscal autonomy creates fiscal imbalance. This usually implies intergovernmental 
transfers to complement regional budgets. This reduces incentives for lower tier governments to 
pursue fiscal discipline. In extreme cases, this may even entail bail-out. Federal fiscal systems are 
therefore complemented with control systems on the sustainability of public finances at lower tiers. 
 
The variety of fiscal arrangements in different countries makes it hard to examine the interaction 
between regional and federal policies. Some recent studies have made some progress at the 
theoretical level (Rodden et al., 2003). These models do not grasp all aspects of fiscal federalism, 
however. Empirical studies that look into the sustainability of different federal fiscal systems are 
fraught with a major identification problem. Bail-outs are not necessarily an indication of prolonged 
unsustainable fiscal policies. But the absence of bail-out does not necessarily imply that the fiscal 
system is solvent either. Basically, the federal and regional governments may anticipate fiscal 
problems with additional transfers. Expectations of bailouts are what matter for sustainability 
(Bordignon, 2006). These expectations are hard to identify in the budget data we observe. 
 
However, given that additional transfers have to be financed by at least one tier of government, we 
can use the aggregate deficit and debt position as an indicator of sustainability. We extend the 
usual approach in the literature to analyse fiscal sustainability –a positive reaction of the fiscal 
surplus to public debt (Bohn, 1998) –to different tiers of government. We test fiscal sustainability 
for the federal and regional governments in two decentralised countries with a similar degree of 
vertical imbalance, the US and Germany. Results indicate a rather different behaviour of fiscal 
policy in both countries. In the US, both the federal and state governments keep debt under 
control. In Germany instead, lower tier governments do not consolidate at all. The entire fiscal 
adjustment occurs via federal government debt. The federal government cannot induce lower tiers 
to react in a stabilising way to debt. We argue that the different set up of the fiscal system in the 
US and Germany is responsible for these different responses. The US federal government provides 
most of the transfers received by state governments. German Länder are instead mainly sharing 
revenues in the horizontal Finanzausgleich, whereas the federal government has little vertical 
transfers at its disposal to make Länder internalise the spillover on aggregate debt. This set up 
explains the lax application of fiscal rules in Germany. 
 
Keywords: fiscal policy, fiscal rules, EMU, SGP, fiscal federalism.  
JEL codes: E61, E62, H11, H72, H77.  
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FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY ACROSS GOVERNMENT TIERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The ongoing process of shifting political powers to both supra-national and regional 
levels world-wide urges some insight in the process of fiscal decentralisation (Ter-
Minassian, 1997; Wildasin, 1997). The aim of this paper is to analyse how fiscal 
adjustment comes about when both central and sub-national governments are 
involved in consolidation. Devolution of public finances creates problems of fiscal 
imbalance at lower tiers of government. Whereas there usually is a constitutionally 
determined division of spending tasks, revenues are shared across different 
government levels. This creates some fiscal imbalance if fiscal autonomy is not 
complete. In addition to (vertical) transfers from the central government, (horizontal) 
transfers between governments of the same tier complement regional budgets. This 
reduces incentives for lower tier governments to pursue fiscal discipline. In extreme 
cases, this may even entail bail-out. Federal fiscal systems are therefore 
complemented with control systems on the sustainability of public finances at lower 
tiers. 
 
The variety of fiscal arrangements in different countries makes it hard to examine the 
interaction between regional and federal policies. Some recent studies have made 
some progress at the theoretical level (Rodden et al., 2003). These models do not 
grasp all aspects of fiscal federalism, however. Empirical studies that look into the 
sustainability of different federal fiscal systems are fraught with a major identification 
problem. Bail-outs are not necessarily an indication of prolonged unsustainable fiscal 
policies. But the absence of bail-out does not necessarily imply that the fiscal system 
is solvent either. Basically, the federal and regional governments may anticipate fiscal 
problems with additional transfers. Focussing on bail outs overlooks the strategic 
interactions between different tiers of government. Expectations of bailouts are what 
matter for sustainability (Bordignon, 2006). These expectations are hard to identify in 
the budget data we observe.  
 
In the fiscal federalism literature, the problem of consolidation of public finances is 
commonly considered from the sub-national perspective. However, given that 
additional transfers have to be financed by at least one tier of government, we can 
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use the aggregate deficit and debt position as an indicator of sustainability. We test 
sustainability with a fiscal rule in which the budget surplus responds to debt 
developments (Bohn, 1998). This test has become rather popular for assessing fiscal 
sustainability, but the analysis usually applies to general government data. We 
disaggregate the analysis to different tiers of government. We test both a rule for the 
federal government and for a panel of regional fiscal policies in order to get a more 
detailed insight in the reaction of different government tiers. 
 
We test fiscal sustainability for the federal and regional governments in two 
decentralised countries with similar fiscal institutions. Both US states and German 
Länder are subject to budget rules, but are able to issue debt autonomously. The 
federal system in both countries is characterised by a similar degree of vertical 
imbalance. But while in the US, the majority of transfers are provided by the central 
budget, Länder are predominantly financed by intergovernmental transfers which are 
complemented with specific transfers from the central level. At the same time, the tax 
autonomy of lower government tiers is constrained. 
 
Results indicate a rather different behaviour of fiscal policy in both countries. In the 
US, both the federal and state governments keep debt under control. In Germany 
instead, lower tier governments do not consolidate at all. All of the fiscal adjustment 
occurs via federal government debt. The federal government cannot induce lower tiers 
to react in a stabilising way to debt. We argue that the different set up of the fiscal 
system in the US and Germany is responsible for these different responses. The US 
federal government provides most of the transfers received by state governments. 
German Länder are instead mainly sharing revenues in the horizontal Finanzausgleich, 
whereas the federal government has little vertical transfers at its disposal to make 
Länder internalise the spillover on aggregate debt. This set up explains the lax 
application of fiscal rules in Germany. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we develop the test for the 
sustainability of public finances, and show how the identification problem can be 
overcome. In section 3, we present the fiscal rule as a means for testing 
sustainability. We augment the baseline specification to account for different tiers of 
government. Section 4 discusses the results and argues that the financing structure of 
the fiscal system has implications for the consolidation efforts of different tiers of 
government. Concluding remarks follow in section 5. 
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2. TESTING SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS ACROSS GOVERNMENT TIERS 
 
Devolution of public policies may create problems of fiscal imbalance for government 
finances. Federal fiscal systems are therefore complemented with control systems on 
the sustainability of public finances at lower tiers. Fiscal arrangements between the 
first tier and lower levels of government have been set up in a variety of ways in 
different countries. In existing federal states, different solutions have been 
implemented, which range from numerical deficit/debt rules to more cooperative 
solutions. In newly created federal structures, the central government searches for 
agreements with lower tier governments to contribute to stabilisation of the ‘historical’ 
central debt burden (e.g. Belgium). A combination of institutional, political and 
economic factors probably accounts the large differences we observe in the set up of 
fiscal federations. Some recent theoretical studies have made some progress in 
examining the interaction between regional and federal policies. However, these 
models cannot grasp all aspects of fiscal federalism (Rodden et al., 2003). 
 
The problem of fiscal unsustainability common to all federal countries is the 
incompatibility of the constitutionally determined division of spending tasks, and the 
sharing of (tax) revenues across different government levels. The concern is with the 
incentives that the fiscal system in federal states gives to lower tier governments to 
indulge in unsustainable policies. Usually, the problem of a soft budget constraint 
occurs when regional governments have little reason to adjust the budget to satisfy 
the intertemporal balance. On the spending side, regional governments often have 
very precisely constitutionally stipulated tasks on which it is difficult to renege. On the 
revenue side, governments share tax revenues and sometimes co-decide on tax bases 
and rates. If economic or political linkages across a country’s regions are strong, little 
flexibility is allowed in differentiating regional budgets. This rigidity of the fiscal 
system easily leads to fiscal havoc and the build-up of regional debt. Moreover, 
regional budgets are usually complemented with (vertical) transfers from the central 
government or (horizontal) transfers from other regions. These additional grants can 
further soften the regional budget constraint. 
 
The empirical analysis of sustainability of different federal fiscal systems is scant. The 
main reason is that disentangling the effect of different fiscal systems on aggregate 
fiscal sustainability is fraught with difficulties (Bordignon, 2006). The strategic 
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behaviour of both central and sub-national tiers of government does not allow the 
identification of a sustainability problem at regional level. The central government can 
set up the fiscal system so as to avoid recourse of regions to the central budget. In 
contrast, sub-national levels may anticipate future adjustments in grants of other 
governments. Hence, a bail-out is not necessarily an indication of unsustainable fiscal 
policies. But the absence of bail-outs does not imply that the fiscal system is solvent 
either. Basically, the federal and regional governments may anticipate fiscal problems 
with additional transfers long before. Expectations of bailouts are what matter for 
sustainability (Bordignon, 2006). These expectations are hard to identify in the fiscal 
data we observe.1 
 
Most studies focus on cases of regional default and bailout (Rodden et al., 2003). 
However, the identification problem occurs because the focus is on regional public 
finances. Expectations of bailout and the consequences for sustainability of regional 
public finances are indeed hard to detect as we need to uncover the incentive 
structure of the regional government. However, if we consider sustainability from the 
aggregate level, we can avoid making assumptions on how the fiscal system affects 
the expectations of bailout by looking into the evolution of general government 
deficits and debt. As additional transfers have to be financed by at least one tier of 
government, we can use the aggregate deficit and debt position as an indicator of 
sustainability. A fiscal system is then characterised by a soft budget constraint if at 
least one tier of government does not need to face the consequences of the creation 
of public debt and the sustainability of its own public finances. 
 
To that end, we recast a test for debt sustainability in terms of a fiscal policy rule à la 
Bohn (1998) that accounts for the interaction between various tiers of government. 
Fiscal policy is deemed sustainable when the government obeys to the intertemporal 
budget constraint. I.e., the sum of the present discounted value of expected future 
primary surpluses suffices to pay off current debt. Alternative tests of the 
intertemporal budget constraint have been suggested in the literature. These are 
usually based on the time series properties of deficit and debt variables. Tests for the 
stationarity of debt and surpluses, or the cointegration between spending and 
revenues, entail rather strict economic assumptions. There is in fact a broad class of 
stochastic processes that violate these time series properties, but nonetheless satisfy 
                                                 
1 Bordignon and Turati (2005) isolate these expectations for regional Italian health expenses using EMU 
entry as a natural experiment. Heppke-Falk and Wolff (2007) identify moral hazard of investors in the 
German regional bond market. 
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the intertemporal budget constraint (Bohn, 2007). A robust alternative test for 
sustainability can be based on the response of the fiscal surplus st  to initial public 
debt *tb , as in (1): 
 
    ttt bs μρ += * .  (1) 
 
A strictly positive response of the government to debt developments is a sufficient 
condition for fiscal policy satisfying the intertemporal budget constraint (Bohn, 1998). 
The basic intuition is that 0>ρ  in (1) implies that future debt is reduced by factor 
n)1( ρ−  at horizon n  indicating compliance to the budget constraint. The strength of 
the fiscal rule lies in its robustness.2 
 
We argue that we can extend the test to different tiers of government, and infer on a 
problem of soft budget constraints. In this way, we avoid making assumptions on the 
expectations of bail-out. By testing the response of surpluses to debt, we may 
disregard the strategic interactions between tiers of government. The fiscal system is 
only a latent variable in our tests. 
 
In particular, in a reaction function like (1), a strictly positive ρ  response of the 
general government surplus to the debt stock of the general government is a 
sufficient condition for aggregate sustainability. Sustainability could still be compatible 
with a soft budget problem if at least one tier of government takes on the burden of 
debt of another government level. Direct bail-out or government transfers by one tier 
may compensate for the debt build-up of another tier of government. The problem of 
soft budget constraint eventually depends on the unsustainability of one or more tiers 
of government. Hence, we need to look into fiscal rules for different government 
levels, and their respective adjustment parameters ρ . We need some further 
restrictions to arrive at a testable fiscal rule. Let us assume there is one federal 
government, and N-1 regions in the country. We denote variables for the federal 
government level with subscript ‘1’ and the regions by 2, … , N. The condition (2) 
                                                 
2 The only necessary assumptions are that the data generating process for fiscal policy is stationary and 
ergodic. The residual tμ  is a composite of other determinants that in the aggregate are assumed to be 
bounded as a share of GDP. It can be shown that that 0>ρ  also holds for fiscal policies that react in a 
non-linear way to debt (Bohn, 2005). Likewise, it is sufficient that the condition applies infinitely often 
within sample (Canzoneri et al., 2001). Of course, 0>ρ  is not a necessary condition and hence there 
exist fiscal policies that violate this condition but still are sustainable. 
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decomposes the restriction 0>ρ  for the different tiers, 
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>+=
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We can test this restriction in a system estimate of fiscal rules for the federation and 
all regions jointly. Fiscal policy will be sustainable if (2) holds. A problem of soft 
budget constraints is present if the federal government consolidates more than the 
regions consolidate jointly. In other words, if we estimate a system like (3), then 
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the condition ∑
=
>
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i
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1 ρρ  is sufficient to have a problem of soft budget constraints, 
even if (2) holds. 
 
Except in a few countries that have devolved more powers to regions (e.g. Belgium), 
there are no agreements to share the historical debt burden of the federation. Usually, 
fiscal control mechanisms that are written in the constitution require regional 
governments to pay only attention to its own debt burden. Hence, we might rather 
test a fiscal rule (4) for each tier of government individually: 
 
    tititi bs ,
*
,, μρ += .   (4) 
 
In this case, every tier of government sets its surplus in response to its stock of public 
debt. The condition that  
 
    0>iρ   Ni ,...,1=  (5) 
 
implies that every tier of government runs a sustainable fiscal policy. Consequently, 
there will be no problem of soft budget constraints. This is a very strong restriction, as 
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the fiscal system imposes a hard budget constraint on all tiers.3 
 
In order to focus on the relation between the federal and the regional governments, a 
weaker condition than (5) can be sufficient for the absence of a soft budget 
constraint. It is sufficient that the federal government runs a sustainable policy, and 
that on average the reaction of all regional governments is sustainable to have a hard 
budget constraint. I.e., we test the condition that 01 >ρ  with fiscal rule (1) for the 
federal government, and the condition that regions run sustainable policies in a panel 
version (4) of the fiscal rule. 
 
By splitting up the contribution of the reaction of the general government into the 
response of both federal and regional governments, we can attribute the burden of 
consolidation to a particular tier of government. Moreover, we shed some light on how 
to spread the burden of fiscal adjustments across various tiers of government to 
maintain fiscal sustainability at the aggregate level.4 
 
In first instance, we simply compare the debt sustainability response for the different 
levels of government. We test sustainability of fiscal policy on a baseline fiscal rule as 
(1). We estimate the rule by OLS for the general government, i.e. the consolidated 
budget of both central and regional governments. We then compare the contribution 
of either the central government or regional fiscal policies in responding to debt 
developments. We provide fiscal rule estimates for the federal government. For the 
regional governments, we apply panel OLS estimates of the fiscal rule for all regions 
jointly. This ignores important cross-dependencies in state budgets due to economic 
and institutional links (Case et al., 1993). All regions share a common monetary and 
federal fiscal policy. There are also changes in federally mandated expenditures that 
influence state budgets. Moreover, mobile tax bases implicitly impose some 
constraints on revenues. We control for this heterogeneity by subsuming these in the 
fixed effects. 
 
                                                 
3 The restriction 0>iρ  with Ni ,...,2=  would not require the federal government to run sustainable 
fiscal policies. At first sight, it may seem odd that regions would bail-out the central government. There 
are two reasons why this might happen though. First, a few (con)federations exist of strong regions and 
a weak center. Switzerland and Brazil are examples. Second, the federal government often has privileged 
access to central bank financing in the common currency, and thus faces a softer budget constraint. 
4 Darby et al. (2005) stress the importance of fiscal adjustment across all government levels for 
achieving an economically successful consolidation. Wibbels and Rodden (2006) examine the cyclicality of 
central versus regional fiscal policies. 
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The setting of fiscal policy is determined by many other factors of course.5 Fiscal rules 
have not only been used to assess fiscal sustainability, but to gauge the sensitivity of 
some fiscal policy indicator to the cycle yt. There are cyclical variations in the surplus 
because of the workings of automatic stabilisers. Hence, we could rewrite the fiscal 
rule (1) as follows: 
 
tttt ybs εαρ ++= * .  (6) 
 
We specify all fiscal variables in ratios to GDP. We will take as the initial debt stock *tb  
the lagged debt ratio to GDP. As for the cyclical indicator, we take the growth rate of 
GDP, as proxied by the first log difference of real GDP. 
 
3. SHARING THE BURDEN OF DEBT 
 
3.1. The fiscal system in the US and Germany 
 
The US and Germany provide a good testing ground for this hypothesis. Both are 
federal countries with rather similar institutional settings for fiscal policy. Both US 
states and German Länder are able to issue debt autonomously, but neither have 
access to central bank financing, nor can they be sued and trialled for bankruptcy. The 
conduct of regional fiscal policy is constrained by fiscal rules. In the US, these rules 
are self-imposed but have not avoided bankruptcy at the county or city level.6 Article 
115 of the German Basic Law allows for a ‘golden rule’ deficit and this applies both to 
the federal and the state governments. Only under the exceptional circumstances of a 
general economic disequilibrium is further deficit financing allowed. The interpretation 
of Article 115 has been rather generous, however, as prolonged violations of this rule 
have never led to court trials, nor to any reprimand by the federal government. Fiscal 
bailouts by the federal government or other regional governments are not explicitly 
prohibited. Two small German states – Bremen and Saarland – sued the German 
government for the Federal Constitutional Court when a fiscal crisis loomed at the end 
of the eighties. The Court forced the Federal government to directly finance both 
states’ budgets on the basis of the constitutional principles of fiscal homogeneity and 
                                                 
5 We condition our analysis on some alternative ‘political’ explanations for unsustainable public finances, 
such as political affinity of regions and the federal government, political party in power, coalition 
formation, size of the region etc.. Bordignon (2006) provides an overview of some empirical results in 
this area. 
6 Some well known examples are New York City in the 1970s, Orange County in the 1980s and 
Washington DC and Philadelphia in the 1990s. 
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the equalisation of living conditions.7 
 
The structure of regional budgets is similar in both fiscal systems. US states and 
German Länder are responsible for about 40% of total government spending (figure 
1a). While this share has remained constant over the nineties, US states have been 
increasing their relative importance and now account for half of all government 
spending. A good summary indicator of the dependence of regions on transfer 
financing is vertical fiscal imbalance. The ratio of received transfers on total regional 
government spending reflects the gap between the sub-national government’s own 
revenue and its expenditure responsibilities.8 Regional budgets in the US and 
Germany are funded by grants to a similar degree (figure 1b). Nonetheless, while the 
majority of transfers to US states are provided by the federal budget, Länder are 
predominantly financed by intergovernmental transfers. Fiscal homogeneity across 
German Länder requires the balancing of resources over different tiers of government 
and between economically weak and strong regions. This horizontal repartition of 
government revenues (‘Länderfinanzausgleich’) is explicitly written into the German 
Constitution.9 These are further complemented with vertical transfers from the federal 
level to further reduce economic disparities and finance specific tasks.10 A second 
consequence of fiscal homogeneity is a strong degree of fiscal harmonisation that 
reduces the possibility of Länder to adjust tax revenues. US states can count on 
nearly 80% of adjustable tax revenues and share tax agreements for about 20%. In 
contrast, German Länder have full competence over about 20% of tax revenues 
(figure 1c). 
 
3.2. Data 
 
                                                 
7 Fiscal crises in other Länder have largely been avoided by a mixture of controls on the projected debt 
service of Länder, the coordination of financial policies for all tiers of government by the Financial 
Planning Council, and administrative controls on local government financing. 
8 Various studies have found that the probability of a bailout depends on this indicator (Singh and 
Plekhanov, 2005). 
9 No German government tier has direct decision power on tax rates, but needs agreements with all other 
tiers before rates can be changed for the entire federation. Only a quarter of regional revenues are 
earmarked to one tier of government only whereas the remaining three quarters of all revenues are 
shared with the other units of government. This leaves the states with little flexibility on the revenue side 
of the budget. 
10 Horizontal transfers are shared VAT-revenues so that each state reaches at least 92% of average fiscal 
capacity. Additional vertical transfers compensate for the cost of political administration, smooth the 
transitional losses and gains for the various states after Reunification, and – importantly – contribute to 
the consolidation of debt in Bremen and Saarland. The latter vertical grants account for 10% of total 
revenues for the West German states, but this amounts up to 40% for the new states. The horizontal 
grants reduce on average 4% of revenues in the West German states, to add up to 7% of extra fiscal 
capacity in the East. See Seitz (1999) and Fitch IBCA (2005) for more details. 
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Fiscal policy data for the US come from two sources. General government data, and 
its division in federal and state government data, come from the NIPA accounts at the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. Detailed data on state fiscal policies come from the 
Census State Governments Finance Database. These data cover fifty US state and 
local governments. Since 2001, consolidated data are not available anymore, and we 
therefore limit the sample to the period 1963-2000. This gives us a balanced panel of 
annual data with 1938 observations.11 
 
Data on German fiscal policies come from different sources. General government 
series are from the OECD. Data for the central government are available from 
different publications of the Statistisches Bundesamt. Regional budget data stem from 
various sources. Fiscal data are consolidated across Länder and towns. Data cover the 
sample 1970-2005. The Reunification of Germany urges us to consider different 
sample periods. We control for the shift in data with an impulse dummy and a time 
trend as of 1991. In addition, we will consider two different periods: 1970-1990 for 
the old Länder; 1991-2005 for both new and old Länder. The former Eastern German 
Länder have participated in the Finanzausgleich system since 1994 only. We finish the 
sample in 2005 as a major reform of the German fiscal system has taken place. 
 
We plot in figure 2a the net lending ratios to GDP for the different government tiers in 
the US. Fiscal policy in the US is mainly dominated by variations in federal fiscal 
policy. The constant trend towards deficits has been reversed under the Clinton 
Administration to reach surplus in 1998 again. A similar trend is much less outspoken 
for state fiscal policies. As a consequence, federal deficits mainly contribute to the 
continued rise in public debt (figure 2b). State debt ratios hover around 15 per cent of 
GDP. A closer look at the state deficits and debt ratios shows a more varied picture. 
We have plotted histograms for both the net lending and debt ratio for the panel of 
states (figure 3a-b). Notice that all series are expressed as ratios to gross state 
product. There is no evident deficit bias. On average, there is a slight deficit, but the 
distribution is skewed towards surpluses around ratios that otherwise peak around 
zero. The deficits are also not concentrated in a few large borrowers, and it is no 
surprise then that there are no outliers in the debt ratio either. The mean debt ratio 
stands at 14 per cent of gross state product, and the highest ratio observed (37 per 
                                                 
11 For a detailed description of variables and data sources, see the Appendix. 
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cent) is still low in comparison.12 Apparently, state fiscal policies are rather well 
behaved. 
 
German regional policies are as important as the federal budget in determining the 
overall budget balance. The aggregate deficit of the Länder has been rather constant 
since the seventies at about 1%. Most of the variation in the balance of the general 
government is due to changes in the fiscal stance of the federal government (figure 
4a). These reflect the strong spending boost of the Brandt government, German 
Reunification and the consolidation since entry in EMU. Both the federal government 
and the Länder contribute in almost equal proportions of 30 per cent to the overall 
debt position. German Reunification has been nearly completely financed by federal 
debt issues. In recent years, the federal government contributes about 10 per cent 
more than the regional tier (figure 4b). 
 
We have displayed the deficit ratios for the German Länder in figure 5a. The situation 
of the three city-states (Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg) and the smallest German 
region (Saarland) are illustrative of the evolution of public finances of all Länder. The 
first characteristic concerns the bailed out states. The peak in deficits in Saarland and 
Bremen – just before the federal bailout in 1993 – is apparent. The continuous 
financial support to both regions has only in part led to a reduction in deficits. Ratios 
have bounced back in recent years. The size of the state does not seem to matter 
much for the deficit. A second striking feature of figure 5a is the dramatic fall in 
Berlin’s budget surplus. This is part of a phenomenon observed in all former Eastern-
German Länder. Deficits quickly shot up directly after Reunification.13 This was a 
problem of very large expenditures not being offset by less than average revenues. 
Until 1994, a large gap between both sides of the budget persisted. At that point, 
these states entered the Finanzausgleich system, and were entitled to extra revenues. 
The consequent increase in revenues brought budgets closer to equilibrium. In 
contrast to Berlin, most former Eastern German states have been able to contain 
deficits to a level that is only slightly higher than in the old Länder. A final feature of 
the fiscal behaviour of lower tiers is the build-up of deficits during the eighties in old 
Länder. After Reunification, these Länder have kept under control deficits, but in 
recent years deficits have begun to grow again in all Länder. 
                                                 
12 The highest debt ratio (37%) occurred in Utah in 1987, the lowest ratio in South Dakota in 1974 (at 
3.34%). The largest deficit happened in 1999 in Wyoming instead, and the largest surplus in 1975 in 
Washington DC. 
13 The only exception here is Sachsen. 
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Hence, the steady position of debt in a range of about 10 to 25 per cent across 
Western German Länder has recently given way to large increases (figure 5b). The 
debt evolution highlights differences in deficits in the Eastern and Western German 
Länder. Public debt levels in the Eastern Länder seem to converge to German average 
of about 35%. Berlin and Bremen, and to a lesser extent Saarland, are accumulating 
ever larger debt.14 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
The estimates of the baseline fiscal rule (1) on general government data confirm some 
of the earlier insights in the literature. US fiscal policy is sustainable over the period 
1963-2000 (Table 1). The response is somewhat weaker than what other studies find. 
Most other studies find a response of the primary surplus that is nearly the double. 
Bohn (2005) argues that a weak debt response is due to an omitted variable problem. 
This could be problematic, considering the rather low explanatory power of the model. 
However, the result seems rather robust: the reaction coefficient does not change 
once we allow for a cyclical response of the budget in the fiscal rule (6). In addition, 
we consider a much more homogeneous sample period than Bohn (2005). 
Nevertheless, even over the period 1963-2000 there is some evidence of significant 
breaks in the debt response (Table 1). The Andrews tests indicate a significant break 
in 1967, which coincides with the increasing expenses of the Vietnam War. However, 
if we control for possibly varying volatility in the subsamples before and after this 
break (Stock and Watson, 2003), the test locates the break in 1994. This heralded the 
start of the long economic boom and the consolidation of public debt by the Clinton 
Administration. As either break is located at the end of the sample, we cannot 
explicitly model the differences in debt response. 
 
For Germany, the response of the government to debt is insignificant instead. With a 
control for a cyclical response of the budget, there is some weak evidence that the 
budget of all government tiers together becomes sustainable. This is in line with the 
weak or insignificant responses that several other studies have found on general 
government data (Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay, 2005). One might suspect that 
Reunification profoundly changed the fiscal system. Break tests on the fiscal rule show 
the relevance of the data shift. Galì and Perotti (2003) or Greiner and Kauermann 
                                                 
14 Berlin applied for federal government intervention in October 2006, but its request was repealed by the 
Federal Constitutional Court. 
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(2007) find weaker responses to debt over the nineties. However, if we condition the 
break test on the data shift (and control for changes in volatility in the subsamples), 
then there is evidence of a change in debt responses in the early eighties. This break 
is only precisely estimated for the fiscal rule (6) that allows for a cyclical reaction. This 
break is due to the large changes in fiscal policy in the seventies. Government 
spending (mainly on social transfers) boomed under the Brandt government in 1976. 
Fiscal policy in the eighties was instead aimed at a gradual consolidation. We 
henceforth continue with a split up of the sample in the periods 1970-1990 and 1991-
2005, and find a difference in debt consolidation too. The debt response is 
insignificant for West-Germany, whereas there is some weak evidence that German 
fiscal policy became more sustainable afterwards after Reunification. The explanatory 
power of the fiscal rule is rather weak: we find a weak debt response only if we 
include a cyclical reaction of the surplus. Note that the finding of weakly procyclical 
policies has been a common finding for German fiscal policy. 
 
The responsibility of different government tiers for the aggregate debt responses is 
different in the US and Germany. We test the sustainability of the federal government 
in all states or Länder jointly with system (3). Table 2 shows that the US federal 
government responds only weakly to aggregate public debt. Unsurprisingly, given that 
the structural breaks we detect for the general government are related to activities of 
the federal government (defence), we find a similar structural break in 1967 or 1994. 
In contrast to the weak debt response of the federal government, consolidation in the 
US states is much stronger. Only 3 out of 50 states do not contribute to the 
stabilisation of the aggregate debt burden. We strongly reject that the sum of regional 
stabilisation coefficients is smaller than the stabilisation effort of the federal 
government. Hence, not only is US fiscal policy sustainable, there are in addition no 
soft budget constraints that shift the burden of stabilisation to other tiers of 
government. 
 
Actually, government tiers in the US fiscal system face an even harder budget 
constraint. We test fiscal rules separately for the federal government and the panel of 
US regions. The federal government’s stabilising response to federal debt is strong 
and significant (Table 3). The stabilising response to debt remains if we control for a 
cyclical reaction of the federal budget, albeit it is weak.15 At the same time, the 
                                                 
15 In contrast to Wibbels and Rodden (2006), the cyclicality of regional budgets is low. Cyclical variations 
are non-existent (or even procyclical) in the German Länder budgets. 
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reaction of state fiscal surpluses to debt is equally strong to their respective state 
debts. Hence, we would argue that fiscal responsibilities in the US fiscal system are 
clearly set out such that the federal and state governments consolidate their own 
debt. I.e., budget constraints on US states are hard.16 
 
In contrast, the German fiscal system faces some more problems. Fiscal relations are 
less well managed by the federal government and the Länder. The joint reaction of 
both government tiers to aggregate debt indicates widespread fiscal problems (Table 
4). The federal government does not react in a significant way to public debt 
developments, and half of the Länder do neither. The debt response of the regional 
governments is not obviously stronger than that of the federal government. Hence, 
fiscal policy is unsustainable but it is not clear that this owes to a problem of soft 
budget constraints. Fiscal problems have not started with Reunification, nor owe these 
to large deficits in the new Länder. The fiscal system ran into trouble for the former 
West-German Länder already. If anything, the problems of unsustainability of German 
public finances were even more widespread before Reunification. The federal 
government was running down surpluses in the wake of increasing debt. In addition, 
only two Länder would contribute to debt stabilisation whereas a majority of old 
Länder does so after 1991. In contrast, only two out of six Länder run unsustainable 
policies. For none of the sample periods is it possible to reject that the German federal 
and regional governments face a hard budget constraint. 
 
As the aggregate debt burden may hides a shift of liabilities from one government tier 
to the other, we test the fiscal rule for the federal government alone (Table 5). This 
shows the lack of a significant response to federal debt. The few observations 
available in the subsamples make inference more awkward. One might read the shift 
from a negative to a positive response after 1991 as evidence of a greater awareness 
of the sustainability problem since Reunification. The Länder ignore fiscal 
sustainability altogether (Table 6). We find a significant negative reaction of the 
Land’s surplus to an increase in Land debt if we control for the cyclical reaction of 
Land budgets. And whereas in the pre-Reunification period, West-German Länder did 
not respond in any way to public debt, we find that these Länder have seriously been 
running down surpluses since. Surprisingly, Länder budgets have been procyclical 
since 1991, but were able to stem cyclical fluctuations before Reunification. In 
                                                 
16 The estimation of a fiscal rule for every state individually confirms positive debt responses (results not 
reported). 
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contrast, the new Länder have set surpluses to counter debt rises in their region. To 
sum up, there is substantially more heterogeneity across the German Länder.17 It is 
not clear on statistical grounds that there is a soft budget constraint problem though. 
 
The reason for the strong differences in debt responses in the US and Germany could 
be of economic or political kind. Given the strong similarities of both fiscal systems, 
one nevertheless wonders about the strongly different outcome in terms of debt. Pork 
barrel politics could happen both in US states or German Länder. Government 
spending benefits local citizens but the costs in terms of tax increases are borne by 
the common pool of US or German tax payers. Nonetheless, the debt problem seems 
to be intrinsic to the set up of the German fiscal system: there has been no major 
shift in sustainability with Reunification. Rodden et al. (2003) attribute the lack of 
fiscal discipline in Germany to the cooperative approach to fiscal federalism. I.e., the 
federal and Land governments overlap in their spending competences, and share 
revenues on common tax bases with a strong degree of harmonisation of tax rates. 
Moreover, a large share of spending and the majority of tax decisions are made after 
an agreement has been reached between the federal government and all Länder. 
 
Cooperative fiscal federalism substantially complicates the setting of federal and 
regional budgets as spending and revenue sides become rather rigid. The build-up of 
debt at regional level does not depend on the overall degree of vertical fiscal 
imbalance, but on the financing of this gap. In particular, Laubach (2006) 
hypothesises that fiscal systems financed by horizontal grants reduce incentives for 
regional governments to take debt developments in consideration. Vertical transfers 
instead give the federal government leverage over the fiscal policy of every region. In 
this way, the central government internalises the effects of regional fiscal policies in 
its grants scheme. The internalisation of the effects on the aggregate debt position 
renders the regional budgets more responsive to debt build up. In contrast, if 
horizontal transfers make up the major part of the financing gap, regions are less 
inclined to adjust their fiscal policies. As a consequence, the response to regional (and 
aggregate) debt is weakened. According to Laubach (2006), specifically earmarked or 
matching grants have increased the power of the US central government over 
spending decisions of states. Similarly, a gradual tendency to co-finance regional 
                                                 
17 Many Länder disregard sustainability of their debt at the regional level (results for individual fiscal rules 
are not reported). 
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tasks of Länder has increased the bargaining position of the government in Berlin 
(Seitz, 1999). 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The ongoing process of fiscal decentralisation world-wide urges some insight in the 
process of fiscal adjustment in federal states (Ter-Minassian, 1997; Wildasin, 1997). 
The aim of this paper is to analyse how fiscal adjustment comes about when both 
central and sub-national governments are involved in consolidation. In particular, we 
examine whether fiscal systems are subject to a problem of soft budget constraints. 
We test fiscal sustainability for central and regional governments with fiscal rules. We 
extend the usual approach in the literature to analyse fiscal sustainability to consider 
soft budget constraint problems between different tiers of government. 
 
We analyse fiscal behaviour of different government tiers in the US and Germany. 
Institutional settings and the fiscal structure are rather similar in both countries. 
Spending capacity and the degree of vertical imbalance are rather similar in the US 
and Germany. However, horizontal transfers are more important for regional budgets 
in Germany. Länder also have less political power over their tax bases. Results 
indicate rather different behaviour of fiscal policy in both countries. In the US, both 
the federal and state governments keep debt under control. In Germany instead, 
lower tier governments do not consolidate at all. All of the fiscal adjustment occurs via 
central government debt. The central government cannot induce lower tiers to react in 
a stabilising way to debt. It has little vertical transfers at its disposal to make Länder 
internalise the spillover on aggregate debt. Moreover, the application of fiscal rules is 
lax. 
 
This paper is a first step in the empirical analysis of fiscal relations between different 
government tiers. We have abstracted from many issues. First, the specification of the 
fiscal rule is simple. Interesting insights can be derived from a reaction of different 
budget items. Adjustments on the spending or on the revenue side have rather 
different implications. There is much evidence on the ‘flypaper’ effect of additional 
central government transfers to lower tiers. In particular, the consolidation effort may 
vary in response to own revenues, vertical grants or horizontal transfers. This would 
shed more light on the nature of the soft budget constraint. More detailed data are 
necessary to this end. Second, the empirical analysis ignores any spillover effect of 
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fiscal policy across regions. Several authors have shown the importance of tax 
competition and spending reductions at lower tiers of government (Brückner, 2003). 
Similar evidence at first and second government tiers is more limited (Redoano, 
2007). Finally, fiscal transfer systems are mostly designed to address a problem of 
redistribution across regions. Transfers are permanent and may not always lift the 
region out of economic havoc (Obstfeld and Peri, 1998). Empirical work in this area is 
still in its infancy as most theoretical models cannot address this issue in a 
satisfactory way (Bordignon, 2006). 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Fiscal rule, (1) and (6), general government: tt1tt ybcs ε+α+ρ+= −  
US Germany 
 1962-2000 1971-2005 1971-1990 1991-2005 
 (1) (6) (1) (6) (1) (6) (1) (6) 
ρ  0.06 0.05 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.21 0.14 0.15 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.69) (0.06) (0.95) (0.29) (0.14) (0.15) 
α   0.14  -0.81  -0.12  -0.26 
  (0.12)  (0.06)  (0.27)  (0.74) 
         
obs 38 38 35 35 20 20 15 15 
R2 0.17 0.20 0.07 0.13 0.01 0.08 0.18 0.19 
         
 1967 1991 1982 1976 - - - - 
AQ (0.08) (0.27) (0.30) (0.25)     
AP (0.03) (0.21) (0.29) (0.17)     
Bai 1966 1994 1983 1981     
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
 [-;-] [-;-] [1976;2000] [1979;1983]     
Notes: heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust OLS estimates; AQ and AP indicate the corrected Andrews 
Quandt and Andrews Ploberger break date for the fiscal rule; the breaktest of Bai is Bai (1997), with the 33% 
confidence interval. 
 
Table 2. System of fiscal rules (3), US states, 1963-2000. 
state ρ p-value state ρ p-value 
federal 0.03 (0.13)    
AK 0.27 (0.01) MT 0.07 (0.00) 
AL 0.02 (0.01) NC 0.03 (0.00) 
AR 0.05 (0.00) ND 0.05 (0.00) 
AZ 0.04 (0.00) NE 0.08 (0.00) 
CA 0.03 (0.02) NH 0.04 (0.00) 
CO 0.05 (0.00) NJ 0.04 (0.00) 
CT 0.01 (0.22) NM 0.03 (0.10) 
DC 0.05 (0.00) NV 0.02 (0.09) 
DE 0.07 (0.00) NY 0.04 (0.01) 
FL 0.05 (0.00) OH 0.08 (0.00) 
GA 0.03 (0.00) OK 0.05 (0.00) 
HI 0.05 (0.01) OR 0.08 (0.00) 
IA 0.04 (0.00) PA 0.05 (0.00) 
ID 0.07 (0.00) RI 0.03 (0.04) 
IL 0.03 (0.00) SC 0.03 (0.00) 
IN 0.03 (0.00) SD 0.08 (0.00) 
KS 0.04 (0.00) TN 0.04 (0.00) 
KY 0.08 (0.00) TX 0.05 (0.00) 
LA 0.04 (0.00) UT 0.08 (0.00) 
MA 0.01 (0.22) VA 0.04 (0.00) 
MD 0.06 (0.00) VT 0.04 (0.01) 
ME 0.05 (0.00) WA 0.07 (0.00) 
MI 0.04 (0.00) WI 0.09 (0.00) 
MN 0.06 (0.00) WV 0.05 (0.00) 
MO 0.06 (0.00) WY 0.08 (0.00) 
MS 0.04 (0.00) sum 2.71 (0.01) 
Notes: p-values between parentheses. 
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Table 3. Fiscal rule, (1) and (6): US, 1962-2000. 
 federal government state governments 
  (1) (6) (1) (6) 
     ρ  0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
α   0.08  -0.06 
  (0.35)  (0.00) 
     
obs 38 38 1887 1887 
R2 0.19 0.20 0.08 0.10 
     
R2 within   0.05 0.07 
R2 between   0.21 0.19 
R2 overall   0.08 0.10 
Hausmann   1059.31 1144.58 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
     
 1967 1992 - - 
AQ (0.08) (0.36)   
AP (0.03) (0.18)   
Bai 1966 1994   
 (0.00) (0.00)   
 [-;-] [-;-]   
Notes: heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust OLS 
estimates; AQ and AP indicate the corrected Andrews Quandt and 
Andrews Ploberger break date for the fiscal rule; the breaktest of 
Bai is Bai (1997), with the 33% confidence interval. 
 
Table 4. System of fiscal rules, German Länder, 1970-2005. 
 all Länder 
1970-2005 
old Länder 
1970-2005 
old Länder 
1970-1990 
old Länder 
1991-2005 
new Länder 
1991-2005 
 ρ p-value ρ p-value ρ p-value ρ p-value ρ p-value 
federal -0.01 (0.36) -0.01 (0.38) -0.06 (0.06) 0.00 (0.88) 0.00 (0.89) 
BE 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 
BW 0.00 (0.35) 0.00 (0.34) 0.00 (0.67) 0.00 (0.24)   
BY 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.86) 0.00 (0.49)   
HB 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.10) 0.00 (0.87)   
HE 0.00 (0.06) 0.00 (0.06) 0.00 (0.24) 0.00 (0.14)   
HH 0.00 (0.71) 0.00 (0.71) 0.00 (0.91) 0.00 (0.23)   
NI 0.00 (0.75) 0.00 (0.76) 0.00 (0.18) 0.00 (0.01)   
NW 0.00 (0.26) 0.00 (0.26) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)   
RP 0.00 (0.70) 0.00 (0.71) 0.00 (0.76) 0.00 (0.00)   
SH 0.00 (0.08) 0.00 (0.08) 0.00 (0.46) 0.00 (0.10)   
SL 0.00 (0.19) 0.00 (0.19) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.04)   
BB 0.00 (0.00)       0.00 (0.00) 
MV 0.00 (0.20)       0.00 (0.12) 
SN 0.00 (0.00)       0.00 (0.00) 
ST 0.00 (0.00)       0.00 (0.00) 
TH 0.00 (0.00)       0.00 (0.00) 
sum 0.01 (0.21) 0.00 (0.29) 0.00 (0.38) 0.00 (0.20) 0.01 (0.03) 
Notes: p-values between parentheses. 
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Table 5. Fiscal rule, German government 
federal government 
1971-2005 1971-1990 1991-2005   
(1) (6) (1) (6) (1) (6) 
       ρ  -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.05 
 (0.75) (0.76) (0.46) (0.38) (0.44) (0.21) α   0.59  0.30  0.31 
  (0.61)  (0.08)  (0.83) 
       
obs 34 34 20 20 14 14 
R2 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.23 0.03 0.04 
       
 1975 1976 - - - - 
AQ (0.23) (0.29)     
AP (0.14) (0.19)     
Bai 1984 1979     
 (0.00) (0.00)     
 [1979;1984] [1977;1981]     
Notes: heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust OLS estimates; AQ and AP indicate the 
corrected Andrews Quandt and Andrews Ploberger break date for the fiscal rule; the breaktest of 
Bai is Bai (1997), with the 33% confidence interval. 
 
Table 6. Fiscal rule, panel fixed effects, German Länder 
all Länder old Länder new Länder 
1970-2005 1970-1990 1991-2005 1991-2005   
(1) (6) (1) (6) (1) (6) (1) (6) 
         ρ  0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.08 -0.02 
 (0.58) (0.04) (0.24) (0.68) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.40) 
α   -0.09  0.08  0.01  -0.16 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.57)  (0.00) 
         
obs 439 439 220 220 154 154 78 78 
         
R2 within 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.55 
R2 between 0.61 0.88 0.95 0.09 0.43 0.42 0.93 0.11 
R2 overall 0.11 0.30 0.35 0.03 0.34 0.34 0.01 0.35 
Hausman 150.85 41.05 62.27 70.93 358.51 340.05 24.51 10.93 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Notes: p-values between parentheses. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. Vertical fiscal imbalance in US states and German Länder. 
(a) sub-national share of expenditures (% general government spending) 
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Figure 2. United States, 1963-2000: fiscal series for government tiers. 
(a) surplus to GDP ratio 
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Figure 3. United States, 1963-200: histogram of fiscal data. 
(a) surplus ratio (% of state GDP) 
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Figure 4. Germany, 1970-2005: fiscal series for government tiers. 
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(b) debt to GDP ratio 
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Figure 5a. State debt ratio for German Länder (% of state GDP). 
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Figure 5b. German Länder: state surplus ratio (% of state GDP). 
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APPENDIX A: data 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
Data on the fiscal policies of the US states and local governments are annual, starting in 1963 
and covering fiscal years till 2000. The dataset contains series on total expenditure, total 
revenues, total interest on debt and outstanding debt. 
 
Data come from the Annual Surveys of State and Local Government Finances and Census of 
Governments, as published in Government Finances, by the Bureau of the Census. These fiscal 
data are statistical measures, and do not represent an accounting statement. A further caveat 
is that the local government data are obtained from sample-based surveys, except for those 
years in which a Census of governments was conducted. 
 
The data on gross state product come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). There is a 
discontinuity in this series at 1997, where the data change from SIC industry definitions to 
NAICS industry definitions. Gross state product before 1977 come from Oved Yosha’s US 
State-Level Macroeconomic Databank, made available at 
http://econ.tau.ac.il/research/riskshare. 
 
Table A.1. Codes for US states. 
State  State  State  State  State  
Alabama AL Hawaii HI Maine ME New Jersey NJ SouthDakota SD 
Arkansas AR Iowa IA Michigan MI NewMexico NM Tennessee TN 
Arizona AZ Idaho ID Minnesota MN Nevada NV Texas TX 
California CA Illinois IL Missouri MO NewYork NY Utah UT 
Colorado CO Indiana IN Mississippi MS Ohio OH Virginia VA 
Connecticut CT Kansas KS Montana MT Oklahoma OK Vermont VT 
Dist.ofCol. DC Kentucky KY NorthCarolina NC Oregon OR Washington WA 
Delaware DE Louisiana LA NorthDakota ND Pennsylvania PA Wisconsin WI 
Florida FL Massachusetts MA Nebraska NE RhodeIsland RI WestVirginia WV 
Georgia GA Maryland MD NewHampshire NH SouthCarolina SC Wyoming WY 
 
GERMANY 
 
Data on the fiscal policies and GDP of the German Länder come from the joint regional 
database of the federal government and the statistical institutes of the Länder (www.vgrdl.de), 
yearly issues of the Statistical Bulletin of the Statistisches Bundesamt, and several publications 
of the Ministry of Finance. Annual series on total expenditure, total and tax revenues, net 
interest payments, total net lending and government debt are available since German 
Reunification in 1991 for both new and old Länder. Fiscal data for the former West-German 
Länder are available as from 1970. 
 
The 16 Länder can be divided in large states (‘Flächenländer’) and city-states (‘Stadtstaaten’). 
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All data are consolidated to include both local cities and communities. Consolidation across 
state and local levels makes fiscal data of city-states more comparable to those of the large 
states. Intra-state payments between state and local governments are excluded. Notice that 
the latter contain also special funds for bailing out local cities, and are usually conditional and 
to be repaid. 
 
Table A.2. Codes for German States. 
Flächenländer’  
Baden-Würtemberg BW 
Bayern BY 
Brandenburg BB 
Hessen HE 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern MV 
Niedersachsen NI 
Nordrhein-Westfalen NW 
Rheinland-Pfalz RP 
Saarland SL 
Sachsen SN 
Sachsen-Anhalt ST 
Schleswig Holstein SH 
Thuringen TH 
Stadtstaaten  
Berlin BE 
Bremen HB 
Hamburg HH 
 
